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When Do Morally Motivated
Innovators Elicit Inspiration Instead
of Irritation?
Jan Willem Bolderdijk1* , Claire Brouwer2 and Gert Cornelissen2
1 Department of Marketing, University of Groningen, Groningen, Netherlands, 2 Department of Economics and Business,
Pompeu Fabra University, Barcelona, Spain
Innovators (i.e., consumers who are the first to adopt an innovation) are pivotal for the
societal diffusion of sustainable innovations. But when are innovators most influential?
Recent work suggests that morally motivated innovators (i.e., consumers who adopt
an innovation out of concern for the welfare of others) can make fellow consumers
who have not yet adopted that innovation feel morally inadequate. As a self-defense
mechanism, those fellow consumers might dismiss these innovators and their choices.
As a result, ironically, morally motivated innovators might discourage others to adopt
sustainable innovations. In an experimental study, we replicate this pattern, but also
show that moral innovators can elicit a more positive response as well. Specifically, our
results offer initial evidence that morally motivated innovators may be more inspiring
than self-interested innovators, provided that their actions do not directly pose a threat
to the moral self-concept of observers. In sum, our research sheds empirical light on
the conditions under which innovators are likely to facilitate, rather than slow down the
transition to a more sustainable society.
Keywords: social influence, conformity, morality, ethical consumer choices, innovators, early adopters, social
contagion, innovator
INTRODUCTION
Imagine a man arriving home with a brand new electric car. He stops by his neighbors’ house
to show his latest purchase. Sure, the man argues, the car was a bit more expensive, but it does
make a valuable contribution to reduce the pollution problem. How would the neighbor respond
to the man’s morally motivated purchase decision? Would he be inspired to do the same, or rather
discouraged to buy an electric vehicle himself?
Irritation vs. Inspiration
Innovators – consumers who are among the first to deviate from the status quo (Rogers, 2003),
by purchasing for instance an electric car, boycotting brands that use environmentally harmful
packaging, or installing solar panels on their roof – play a pivotal role in the transition to a more
sustainable society. Their public behavior has the potential to speed up the diffusion of sustainable
innovations. First, innovators provide visibility for novel sustainable product alternatives, and thus
increase the likelihood that others notice and consider adopting these alternatives (Starr, 2009;
Bollinger and Gillingham, 2012). Moreover, they provide social proof – their example can pave the
road to adoption for risk averse fellow consumers. Finally, they can impact others unconsciously:
consumers are inclined to conform to the perceived norm (Goldstein et al., 2008), and mimic
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others’ choices (Griskevicius et al., 2012). In short, innovators can
inspire fellow consumers to act sustainably as well.
Innovators may adopt a specific sustainable innovation out of
collective (‘moral’) or individualistic (‘self-interested’) concerns.
People who contribute to the collective good are often applauded
by observers (Gouldner, 1960; Hardy and Van Vugt, 2006;
Griskevicius et al., 2010), especially when they make their
contribution (e.g., buying an electric vehicle) based on moral
(e.g., reduced emissions), instead of self-interested concerns
(e.g., a tax exemption; Lin-Healy and Small, 2012). Given
that observers are more likely to imitate innovators that are
considered likeable (Byrne, 1969; Jiang et al., 2010), moral
innovators, more so than self-interested innovators, should
be influential and inspire observers to follow their example.
Additionally, research showed that witnessing another person’s
selfless behavior is known to cause a sense of elevation (Haidt,
2003; Algoe and Haidt, 2009), an emotion that inspires observers,
and mobilizes them to emulate that virtuous behavior.
In sum, these findings suggest that innovators may
encourage fellow consumers to make a similar sustainable
choice, particularly when the innovator’s deviant choices are
motivated by moral concerns.
However, admiration, and feeling inspired, is not the only
conceivable response to morally motivated innovators. Recent
studies suggest that morally motivated innovators can, ironically,
discourage fellow consumers from following their example (Zane
et al., 2016). Why would that be the case? The moral self is a
central component of people’s overall self-concept. People like
to think of themselves as ethical, fair and righteous (Aquino
and Reed, 2002). However, consumers’ moral preferences do not
always translate into action (e.g., Auger and Devinney, 2007).
People’s moral imperfections become painfully salient when
they are confronted with fellow consumers who, out of moral
concerns, did adopt a sustainable innovation that they failed to
adopt themselves. In other words, morally motivated innovators
can produce discomfort because they implicitly threaten the
moral self-concept of observers (Monin and Jordan, 2009;
Cramwinckel et al., 2013). One common way to neutralize this
threat is by engaging in defensive processing (Täuber et al.,
2014), which may manifest itself in derogating the source of
the threat (Fein and Spencer, 1997): the innovator. In other
words, observers may dismiss morally motivated innovators,
and their choices, in an act of self-preservation (Monin et al.,
2008).
Thus, rather than being admired for their efforts to further the
collective good, morally motivated innovators can be perceived
as threatening, and become a target for denigration and ridicule.
Innovators are particularly likely to elicit defensive responses
when their atypical choices challenge observers’ relative moral
standing. Indeed, meat-eating participants were more likely to
derogate a vegetarian fellow consumer who refused to eat meat
out of moral (“animal welfare”) instead of self-interested (“dislike
the taste”) motives (Cramwinckel et al., 2013).
The findings of Zane et al. (2016) suggest that “do-gooder
derogation” can slow down the diffusion of sustainable
innovations. Participants who preferred to remain ‘willfully
ignorant’ regarding the working conditions under which
apparel was produced tended to denigrate others who, unlike
them, did choose to seek out and consider such ethical
information in their purchase decision. They dismissed these
more morally motivated consumers as being ‘boring’ and
not ‘sexy.’ Importantly, this act of denigration was found to
have important downstream consequences: as people derive
their attitudes from their actions (Bem, 1972), ‘denigrators’
subsequently concluded that they apparently “do not care too
much about ethical standards” (Zane et al., 2016). As a result,
they showed reduced anger toward unethical companies, and,
importantly, were less inclined to support ethical consumer
alternatives.
Self-Involvement
In sum, previous literature suggests that morally motivated
innovators can elicit either irritation or inspiration among
observers. This means that they either act as facilitators of,
or impediments to, the diffusion of novel ethical consumption
alternatives. However, the conditions under which innovators
produce either effect are not well understood. Based on our
reasoning above, we argue that morally motivated innovators are
less likely to elicit irritation when their behavior does not directly
threaten the moral self-concept of observers. When is that the
case?
In the studies by Zane et al. (2016), observers were
‘self-involved’ (Cramwinckel et al., 2015): willfully ignorant
participants were exposed to others who, in the exact same
situation, did choose to seek out ethical product information.
In that case, drawing a negative social comparison is inevitable
for observers: the ethical choices made by others are directly
diagnostic for the self-evaluations of observers. When observers
are ‘self-involved’ (when their moral self-concept is on the line),
derogation is a functional response, as it helps to neutralize the
resulting threat. The setting in those studies may correspond to
naturally occurring circumstances, as for example in the case
of a consumer who decides against the purchase of a fair trade
alternative, and subsequently witnesses a fellow consumer who
does buy the fair trade product.
In many other situations, however, the choice of a morally
motivated innovator does not necessarily have much bearing
on an observer’s self-concept. That is the case, for example,
when the observer has not yet actively considered the ethical
alternative in question before witnessing the innovator’s choice.
Product innovations form a specific instance of that scenario. If a
sustainable innovation is completely novel to observers, and they
never had the chance to consider adopting it, observing someone
else’s decision to adopt that innovation does not produce a
negative social comparison on the side of the observer, nor a
self-concept threat. This is a situation where participants lack
self-involvement. Because observers do not feel threatened in
these situations, there is no reason for them to engage in
defensive processing, and no motive to derogate or dismiss the
innovator.
We argue that in such neutral situations, innovators are
more likely to be inspired by observing the behavior of
innovators. Liberated from the need to engage in self-protective
reasoning, observers can now evaluate the innovator’s merit from
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a psychologically safe position. From that position, especially
morally motivated innovators might be inspiring to observers,
as morally motivated people are typically perceived as more
benevolent and admirable than those who are perceived to act in
their own self-interest (cf. Lin-Healy and Small, 2013). Because
individuals are more likely to imitate whom they like (Byrne,
1969; Jiang et al., 2010), they might be especially likely to imitate
the behavior of morally motivated innovators (cf. Lin-Healy and
Small, 2013).
In conclusion, we predict that morally motivated actions can
provoke admiration and imitation (Haidt, 2003; Algoe and Haidt,
2009) when observers are not self-involved. In that case, we
expect that morally motivated innovators will not elicit irritation,
but rather inspiration.
The Current Research
Recent studies (Zane et al., 2016) documented that morally
motivated innovators can discourage fellow consumers from
choosing the sustainable alternative in situations where observers
are self-involved; they experience the innovator’s action as a
threat to their moral self-concept. We build on this work, but
focus on the possibility of a more positive outcome: when
the innovator’s action does not directly implicate the moral
self-concept of observers, innovators will not be perceived as
threatening. With this threat out of the way, innovators can
potentially inspire fellow consumers, especially when observers
attribute the innovator’s actions to moral convictions. Thus, the
response to sustainable innovators may be more positive among
“neutral observers” – those who stand on the sideline, and witness
the innovators’ morally motivated choices from a psychologically
‘safe’ distance.
In summary, we predict that self-involvement moderates
the response that morally motivated innovators elicit. When
observers are not self-involved, morally motivated innovators
will be evaluated more positively than self-interested innovators
(Hypothesis 1), and may even trigger inspiration (Hypothesis 2).
We predict the opposite pattern for self-involved observers:
morally motivated innovators are evaluated less positively than
self-interested innovators, and demotivate observers to imitate
them.
We tested these predictions in the context of a new, ethical
consumer innovation – the no-packaging grocery store. No-
packaging grocery stores require customers to bring their own
containers to transport their purchases. Because products are
not pre-packaged, containers can be re-used, and consumers
can purchase exactly the amount they need, waste production
is reduced compared to traditional retail options. This concept
is relevant for our study in that consumers can justify their
decision to endorse this store with either morally motivated
(i.e., environmental benefits) or self-interested (i.e., monetary
benefits) reasons. Moreover, it captures a situation that is
fundamentally different from the situations examined previously:
unlike familiar ethically-conscious products (Zane et al., 2016),
the no-packaging store is a new concept that consumers most
likely have not considered themselves. Thus, consumers are in the
comfortable position of observing the choice of an innovator, free
of threat to their self-concept.
MATERIALS AND METHODS
The study employed a 2 (innovator motivation type: moral vs.
self-interested) × 2 (observer: self-involved vs. neutral) between
subjects design. We measured participants’ evaluation of the
innovator, level of self-threat, and liking of the no-packaging
grocery store concept. Using Qualtrics, we created a link to an
online survey (both in Dutch and English), which was posted on
the second author’s Facebook page. The survey was distributed
via Facebook to make sure that only experienced Facebook users,
who are used to similar invitations, would participate in the study.
Participants were blind to the hypotheses. Data were collected
between May 9th and June 7th, 2015. Using a snowball procedure,
284 participants started the survey (266 chose the Dutch version,
18 chose the English version). The Ethical Committee of the
Faculty of Business and Economics (University of Groningen)
provided approval for this study. Written informed consent was
obtained from all participants.
Procedure
In a first phase, all participants were informed about the existence
and the characteristics of the “no-packaging grocery stores,”
including an illustration.
Then, we manipulated self-involvement: half of the
participants were asked to consider whether they would
comply with a request to endorse the opening of more of these
no-packaging grocery stores (self-involved observer condition; see
Figure 1). Complying with the request was deliberately presented
as effortful: it involved following a link to a website where they
would be required to input their personal information, sign an
online petition, and share the link to that petition on their social
network profile. As intended, the large majority of participants in
the self-involved condition (84%) indicated that they would not
comply with such a request. The other half – those in the neutral
condition – did not see this request prior to being exposed to
the innovator. As a result, this manipulation created a group
of participants who had the opportunity to endorse an ethical
innovation, but chose against it (i.e., the self-involved observer
condition), and a group of participants who never had the chance
to consider endorsing the innovation (i.e., the neutral observer
condition).
Next, we introduced a fictitious innovator to participants,
named ‘Tim,’ via a Facebook post, see Figures 2, 3. Participants
read the Facebook post of Tim, who introduced himself as
a fellow student, and who had decided to sign the petition
endorsing the no-packaging grocery stores. In his post, he invites
others to sign the petition as well. We systematically varied
the content of Tim’s Facebook post. In the morally motivated
condition, Tim is introduced as “having a great affinity with
sustainability and strives to act in accordance with what is
best for the environment,” and in his post, he explains that
he decided to support no-packaging grocery stores because of
environmental and moral reasons (Figure 2). His post ends with
the slogan “let’s go green!”. In the self-interested condition, Tim
is introduced as someone who “keeps track of his expenses as
he has a monthly budget that he needs to respect.” In his post,
Tim explains that he signed the petition because this new retail
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FIGURE 1 | Request to support the “no-packaging” store.
model allows him to save money by buying the quantities he
needs (Figure 3). His post ends with the slogan “let’s not waste our
money!”.
In the self-involved observer condition, we further emphasized
the similarities between Tim and the participant by explaining
that Tim “also received the flyer and therefore also had the
opportunity to sign the online petition. In contrast to you,
Tim did choose to sign the online petition and share the link
on his Facebook wall.” In the neutral condition, instructions
merely introduced Tim as someone who had “signed an online
petition to endorse the opening of (more) no-packaging zero
waste grocery stores and shared the link on his Facebook wall.”
After being introduced to Tim, participants answered a
series of questions that, respectively, measured (1) participants’
evaluations of Tim, (2) participants’ perceived level of self-threat
and, after completing a manipulation check, (3) participants’
liking of the no-packaging grocery store concept. The latter was
a proxy for inspiration, as it allowed us to evaluate whether being
exposed to Tim would increase or decrease participants’ intention
to shop in no-packaging grocery stores.
Evaluations of the Innovator
To measure participants’ evaluations of the Tim, we asked them
to complete fourteen 7-point bipolar items (Monin et al., 2008),
evaluating Tim in terms of: stupid–intelligent, weak–strong,
insecure–confident, passive–active, cruel–kind, awful–nice,
cold–warm, dishonest–honest, unfair–fair, unpleasant–pleasant,
dependent–independent, stingy–generous, immature–mature,
and low self-esteem–high self-esteem. For a further assessment of
Tim, participants were asked to indicate on a 7-point Likert scale
[from 1 (strongly disagree) to 7 (strongly agree) to what extent
they would (a) like Tim as a friend, (b) like Tim as a colleague,
and (c) respect Tim as a person]. The combined evaluations
yielded a reliable scale (α= 0.97, M = 5.05, SD= 1.10).
Perceived Self-Concept Threat
Given that direct questions may give rise to social desirable
reponse patterns, we measured self-concept threat indirectly by
examing participants’ self-regard (cf. Cramwinckel et al., 2013).
Specifically, we asked participants to report to what extent they
felt happy with themselves, satisfied with themselves, good,
happy, comfortable, confident, determined, disappointed with
FIGURE 2 | Morally motivated comment.
FIGURE 3 | Self-interested comment.
themselves (reverse-coded), annoyed with themselves (reverse-
coded), disgusted with themselves (reverse-coded), angry with
themselves (reverse-coded), dissatisfied with themselves (reverse-
coded), self-critical (reverse-coded), and guilty (reverse-coded),
on a 7-point Likert scale with 1 (totally not applicable) to 7 (totally
applicable). Answers to these questions were averaged to form
one scale (α= 0.93, M = 5.50, SD= 1.06).
Liking of the No-Packaging Store
We finally gauged observers’ liking of the “no-packaging”
grocery stores, as a means to examine Tim’s potential to inspire
others. We asked participants about the likelihood of them
making a purchase at the “no-packaging” store (1 – Extremely
unlikely to 7 – Extremely likely) and to which extent this retail
concept appealed to them (1 – Not at all to 7 – Extremely).
These items formed a reliable index (α = 0.82, M = 4.87,
SD= 1.42).
Manipulation Check
We included a manipulation check, to ascertain whether
participants had read the stimulus material carefully. Participants
were asked to check the box that described why Tim supported
the concept store. Answer options were (a) it saves money, (b)
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it is better for the environment, and (c) it offers his favorite
products.
RESULTS
From the 284 participants that started the survey, 22 did not
finish, and 29 failed the manipulation check. Given that we are
particularly interested in the responses of participants who made
a different choice than our innovator, we additionally excluded
19 participants who agreed to sign the petition in favor of the
no-packaging store1 . Hence, 214 participants were included in
the analysis. Given the effect sizes reported in previous peer
evaluation studies (Monin et al., 2008), our sample size is
expected to yield a power between 0.88 and 0.99 in detecting
the hypothesized effects (Maxwell et al., 2018). Most participants
(57.5%) were between the ages of 21 and 30 years old, and 53.3%
were female.
We first examined the main and interaction effects of
motivation type and self-involvement on innovator evaluation,
participants’ self-regard, and store liking, and subsequently
examined the underlying process via mediation analysis.
Innovator Evaluation
We performed a 2 (motivation type: morally motivated vs. self-
interested innovator) × 2 (self-involved vs. neutral observers)
ANOVA with innovator evaluation as the dependent variable.
There was no main effect of motivation type, F(1,210) = 0.000,
p = 0.98, but we found a main effect of self-involvement,
F(1,210)= 16.98, p< 0.001. Participants in the neutral condition
(M = 5.33, SD = 0.93) evaluated Tim more positively than
those in the self-involved observer condition (M = 4.74,
SD = 1.19). Importantly, we found the expected interaction
between motivation type and self-involvement, F(1,210)= 23.45,
p < 0.001, see also Figure 4. Post hoc comparisons (using
Tukey’s HSD test) revealed that those in the self-involved
observer condition – those who could have but did not sign the
petition – evaluated Tim more negatively when he employed
morally motivated (M = 4.41, SD = 1.52) instead of self-
interested arguments (M = 5.08, SD= 0.54), Mdifference =−0.67,
p= 0.005, Cohen’s d= 0.59. We find the opposite pattern among
participants in the neutral condition (those who were never
offered to sign the petition). They evaluated Tim most positively
when he employed morally motivated (M = 5.65, SD = 0.97)
instead of self-interested arguments (M = 4.98, SD = 0.75),
Mdifference = 0.67, p= 0.003, Cohen’s d = 0.762.
1The overall pattern of results are similar when including these 19 in the ensuing
analyses. Although it would be theoretically interesting to analyze how participants
who agreed to the petition would respond to the different pioneer motivations, the
limited size of this sample (N = 19) precluded us from making useful inferences.
2Copying the procedure of Monin et al. (2008), we subjected the different
items gauging innovator evaluations to a principled axis factor analysis (Promax
rotation). The results (using the scree plot) unequivocally suggest a 1-factor
solution: 68% of the variance was captured in the first factor. In other words, it
seems that participants who experienced threat evaluated Tim negatively across
the board, as manifested in lower ratings on various dimensions. This effect may
potentially be a manifestation of motivated reasoning – participants, depending
on whether they feel threatened, instantly form a specific overall judgment of Tim,
FIGURE 4 | Moral innovators were preferred to self-interested innovators by
neutral onlookers, but not by self-involved onlookers. Error bars denote 95%
confidence intervals.
Self-Regard
We repeated this analysis, now with participants’ self-regard as
the dependent variable. There was no main effect of motivation
type, F(1,210) = 1.86, p = 0.17, but there was a main effect
of self-involvement, F(1,210) = 12.78, p < 0.001. Participants
in the self-involved condition (M = 5.23, SD = 1.13) were
less satisfied with themselves than participants in the neutral
condition (M = 5.74, SD = 0.95). Importantly, we found the
predicted interaction between motivation and self-involvement,
F(1,210) = 10.08, p = 0.002, see Figure 5. Post hoc comparisons
(using Tukey’s HSD test) revealed that participants in the self-
involved condition – those who could but did not sign the
petition – felt less satisfied with themselves when confronted with
the morally motivated (M = 4.92, SD = 1.36) instead of the
self-interested Tim (M = 5.55, SD = 0.71), Mdifference = −0.63,
p = 0.01, Cohen’s d = 0.58. For participants in the neutral
condition, however, there is no effect of motivation type on self-
regard – participants are satisfied with themselves, regardless
of whether they were confronted with the morally motivated
(M = 5.86, SD = 0.97) or self-interested Tim (M = 5.61,
SD= 0.91), Mdifference = 0.25, p= 0.55, Cohen’s d = 0.27.
Liking of the No-Packaging Store
Finally, as a way to gauge Tim’s potential to inspire, we
examined the effects of self-involvement and motivation type on
participants’ liking of the no-packaging store concept. Motivation
type did not have an influence on participants’ liking of the
store, F(1,210) = 0.08, p = 0.78, but we again found a main
effect of self-involvement, F(1,210) = 4.48, p = 0.04. Those
in the neutral condition (M = 5.07, SD = 1.39) were more
supportive of the novel store concept than those in the self-
involved condition (M = 4.65, SD = 1.43). Importantly, we
found the expected interaction effect between motivation type
and self-involvement, F(1,210) = 5.62, p = 0.019, see Figure 6.
Participants in the self-involved condition evaluated the novel
store concept less positively when that store was advocated by the
which consequently motivates them to also be consistent in the specific dimensions
they rated Tim on.
Frontiers in Psychology | www.frontiersin.org 5 January 2018 | Volume 8 | Article 2362
fpsyg-08-02362 January 10, 2018 Time: 16:54 # 6
Bolderdijk et al. Moral Innovators
FIGURE 5 | Involved participants felt least satisfied with themselves when
they were confronted with a morally motivated innovator. Error bars denote
95% confidence intervals.
morally motivated Tim (M = 4.40, SD = 1.57) instead of self-
interested Tim (M = 4.91, SD = 1.24). However, this difference
was not statistically significant in a Tukey’s HSD post hoc test,
Mdifference = −0.51, p = 0.27, Cohen’s d = 0.36. Participants in
the neutral condition were not thrown off by the presence of a
morally motivated innovator. If anything, there is a trend that
they liked the novel store concept better when it was advocated
by the morally motivated (M = 5.26, SD = 1.27) instead of the
self-interested (M = 4.86, SD= 1.50) Tim, but this difference was
not statistically significant, Mdifference = 0.40, p = 0.43, Cohen’s
d = 0.29.
Mediation Analyses
The results thus far are consistent with our argumentation:
participants in the neutral condition – those who are in the
comfortable position to observe the innovator’s actions from
a psychologically safe distance – are not implicated by the
innovator’s choices, tend to evaluate moral innovators positively,
and may even develop an interest to imitate their choices. For
self-involved observers – those who have considered the ethical
alternative, but decided against it – however, derogating morally
motivated innovators and their choices is a functional response.
When evaluating the innovator, they do not only factor in the
benevolence of the innovator, but may also have a need to protect
their threatened self-concept.
We examined this process more directly. Specifically, our
reasoning implies that self-threat would mediate the effect of
motivation type on (1) innovator evaluation and (2) store liking.
This process is only relevant for participants in the self-involved
condition, as the self-concept of neutral participants is not
challenged by morally motivated innovators. Thus, we tested for
a conditional mediation effect (Preacher et al., 2007).
Employing model 7 (bias-corrected, 1000 bootstrap samples)
of the PROCESS macro (Hayes, 2013), we indeed find that the
indirect effect of motivation type via feelings of self-threat on
innovator evaluation was significant for participants in the self-
involved condition, b=−0.38, SE= 0.16, 95% CI [−0.74,−0.12],
but not for those in the neutral condition, b = 0.15, SE = 0.11,
95% CI [−0.05, 0.40]. Repeating the analysis with store liking as
FIGURE 6 | Involved participants were more enthusiastic about the
no-packaging store when it was promoted by a self-interested innovator.
Neutral participants were more enthusiastic when the store was advocated by
a moral innovator. Error bars denote 95% confidence intervals.
the dependent variable, we find the same pattern; the indirect
effect of motivation type via feelings of self-threat on store
liking was significant for those in the self-involved condition,
b = −0.20, SE = 0.16, 95% CI [−0.42, −0.06], but not for those
in the neutral condition, b = 0.08, SE = 0.16, 95% CI [−0.02,
0.24]. Hence, self-threat only takes up a mediating role when
participants are self-involved.
These results are consistent with our reasoning: the observed
drop in innovator and store liking in the self-involved condition
stems from the self-threat that those participants experience
when confronted with a morally motivated innovator. In
the neutral condition, observers are not bothered by morally
motivated innovators because they pose no threat to their own
self-concept. Thus, they are in a position to applaud and even be
inspired by morally motivated innovators.
DISCUSSION
Zane et al. (2016) found that morally motivated innovators can
elicit irritation and denigration, and discourage other consumers
from imitating their sustainable choices. We replicated this
phenomenon, and documented a boundary condition. We found
support for our reasoning that “do-gooder derogation,” and its
consequences, only occurs when innovators’ sustainable choices
form a threat to observers’ moral self-concept. When there is
no such threat, there is no need for observers to engage in self-
preservation, and they evaluate innovators based on the moral
merit of their choices.
In line with this reasoning, we found that for self-involved
participants, innovators are more likely to be experienced as a
threat, to elicit derogation, and to discourage imitation when they
justify their choices with morally charged arguments instead of
self-interested arguments. On the other hand, when the choices
of the innovator do not directly implicate observers, we found
that participants evaluated moral innovators more positively than
self-interested innovators. This implies that moral innovators are
not necessarily impediments to change, but could even act as
effective change agents, as long as their choices do not form a
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threat to the moral self-concept of observers. In other words,
morally motivated innovators could potentially inspire others to
follow their example. However, the evidence in the current data
for such inspirational effect is limited to a non-significant trend.
Future research is required to further examine this possibility.
Process
As suggested in Zane et al. (2016), but not directly tested, our
moderated mediation analysis suggests that people denigrate
moral innovators in an attempt to restore their threatened self-
concept. However, it remains unclear which process is exactly
responsible for producing this self-concept threat. The nature
of our manipulation allows us to speculate. We included the
fictitious Facebook user ‘Tim’ in our experiments, rather than
introducing a confederate who was physically present and with
whom participants were required to interact (Monin et al., 2008;
Cramwinckel et al., 2013). This more subtle exposure to a morally
motivated innovator proved sufficient to elicit moral self-concept
threat (as evidenced by the significant drop in self-regard among
self-involved participants who were exposed to the moral Tim).
The fact that such a subtle cue has a measurable impact on
participants’ self-regard is telling. Specifically, it suggests that
innovators are not disliked because they represent a different set
of values, because observers fear that innovators may disapprove
of their choices (Minson and Monin, 2012) or because innovators
raise the bar for what is appropriate behavior in a certain setting
for others (Parks and Stone, 2010). Instead, in line with more
recent work (O’Connor and Monin, 2016), our results suggests
that moral innovators produce discomfort because of an internal
process on the side of the observer. Morally motivated innovators
activate observers’ pre-existing sense of moral imperfection.
Thus, the threat seems to emanate from the fact that innovators
can remind fellow consumers of their own moral shortcomings.
That interpretation would also explain why especially those who
care strongly about morality tend to take offense at moral do-
gooders (Cramwinckel et al., 2013). Future research is needed to
uncover the exact nature of this mechanism.
Limitations and Future Research
We did not systematically vary the gender of our male
innovator (“Tim”), which may have suppressed the effects –
female participants could have felt even more threatened if
they were confronted with the actions of morally motivated
“Theresa” instead of “Tim.” Follow-up analyses, however, suggest
that female participants felt as threatened by Tim as male
participants did.
This paper focused on the psychological impact of innovators
on observers, and did not include behavioral measures of
irritation and inspiration. We considered offering participants
the opportunity to revise their earlier decision regarding whether
to sign the petition. We would have predicted that in the
self-interested motivation condition, a larger proportion of
participants would choose to sign the petition when given
another chance, compared to the moral motivation condition.
However, we decided against it, as this would introduce
a confounding mechanism affecting the decision to sign:
deciding to sign the petition on the second occasion would be
inconsistent with earlier behavior. As a result, signing the petition
when the second occasion arises would effectively diagnose
participants’ earlier decision not to sign as “wrong.” Surely,
that is something what participants would be motivated to
avoid. Instead, we used participants’ attitudes toward the no-
packaging stores as a proxy for innovators’ potential to inspire
others.
Although we have no reason to believe that these results are
specifically biased in the direction of our predictions, we welcome
future behavioral studies that build on our initial findings and
extend this research into for instance an actual retail setting,
for example involving in-store customers who are exposed to
a real-life confederate who expresses ethical vs. self-interested
motivations.
In our studies, we simulated a situation in which an innovator’s
moral choices do not imply a threat to the observer, by using
an ethical innovation that most consumers have not yet actively
considered as stimulus material – the no-packaging store. Since
consumers have never declined to adopt this innovation, the
innovator’s behavior does not confront them with a moral
imperfection. As a result, observers do not proceed to derogating
the innovator. There are other factors that influence whether, or
to which extent, morally motivated innovators present a threat
to observers. For instance, an innovator who makes morally
motivated choices might pose less of a threat to observers, if
observers know that the innovators have moral imperfections
themselves (Howe and Monin, 2017). For example, being
confronted with a vegetarian might produce threat and lead to
derogation for meat-eaters (Cramwinckel et al., 2013). However,
if that vegetarian would claim to eat meat once a year, as a
treat to himself, observers may feel less threatened, as their
benchmark for evaluating their moral self-concept is no longer
“moral perfection.” Finally, innovators may distinguish between
the moral value of their act and the person performing it. By
claiming something along the lines of “I am making this choice
because it works for me, but other people should be free to
make their own decisions,” innovators and their choices should
be less threatening to observers (Howe and Monin, 2017). Future
research should test these predictions.
Finally, by using the no-packaging store concept, we aimed to
create a situation in which for the majority of our participants
would not feel self-involved. However, we cannot rule out the
possibility that some of our participants did know the store
concept already, and decided not to shop there. For those
participants, the setting in our study would have been one
of high, rather than low self-involvement. The presence of
such participants would create noise in our data and might
be responsible for not finding larger effects than the ones we
found here. Future studies should verify whether participants are
indeed unfamiliar with the innovation in question, to ascertain all
participants lack a sense of self-involvement.
Implications
In order to secure a sustainable future, it is crucial to develop a
better understanding of how policy makers can sway individual
consumers to make more sustainable (such as environmentally
conscious and socially responsible) consumption choices.
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A number of recent studies have zoomed in on the persuasive
impact of moralization: positioning pro-environmental behavior
as an moral imperative has the potential to convince (at least a
subpart) of the population to act more sustainably (Bolderdijk
et al., 2013). Moralization can be effective because consumers
care deeply about maintaining a moral self-concept (Aquino and
Reed, 2002), which can be achieved by complying with appeals
that are congruent with one’s (idiosyncratic) moral standards
(Kidwell et al., 2013).
A much less studied issue pertains to how moral appeals
for sustainable behavior affect those who choose not to
comply. Recent work Täuber et al. (2015) suggests that
positioning sustainable behavior as a morally superior choice
can have adverse effects on non-compliers: given that they
also strive for a moral self-image, non-compliers may look
for ways to rationalize their behavior, for instance by actively
questioning the veracity of sustainability claims (Campbell and
Kay, 2014). So, while encouraging some consumers to act
more sustainably, moralization can also trigger skepticism and
rebellion among a subset of consumers, and thus further increase
polarization.
Although pertaining to interpersonal dynamics, our work, as
well as that by Zane et al. (2016), provides an important empirical
hint that highlighting consumers’ moral shortcomings –– which is
effectively what moral appeals do in the eyes of those who chose
not to comply – indeed bears the risk of further intensifying the
polarization between those who do and those who do not see
sustainability (e.g., halting climate change) as a goal that merits
behavior change.
So, should policy makers abandon moralization as a strategy
to promote sustainable consumer choices? We believe not,
although caution is required. First, as our findings imply, moral
appeals have the potential to elicit inspiration and imitation,
more so than self-interested appeals. Second, moralization
may have an important function in the transition to a more
sustainable society – moral appeals can facilitate positive spillover
(sustainable behavior in one domain can foster sustainable
behavior in related domains, Evans et al., 2013) and can
help to shape the emergence of new norms (Thøgersen and
Crompton, 2009). Third, in this study, we found negative effects
of moralization on the short term. It is possible that the threat
caused by moral innovators provoke dismissal at first, but can
motivate individuals to follow their example in the longer term.
Future studies should test this possibility.
Insights that help policymakers predict when and why
moralization is most likely to elicit inspiration rather than
rebellion among consumers, is a crucial addition to this literature.
In the context of promoting the uptake of ethical alternatives,
for instance, policy makers walk a thin line between inspiring
and irritating consumers – positioning sustainable products as
a moral imperative (“slavery-free chocolate”, “climate-neutral
cars”), may unintentionally threaten consumers who were in
a position to adopt, but thus far decided against it. As our
studies imply, consumers may not feel threatened, and potentially
even inspired when policy makers present these alternatives as
innovations that consumers, due to their novelty, simply could
not have considered before.
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